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The changing nature of patent litigation over the last fifty 
years has forced patent stakeholders to think differently about 
remedies for patent infringement.
1
  A major catalyst for changes in 
how courts award specific remedies such as injunctions and attorney 
fees has been the successful assertion of patents by entities that do 
not practice the patent (aka Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs), Patent 
Assertion Entities (PAEs), or, colloquially, patent trolls).
2
  Since lost 
profits are not available to those who do not make, use, or sell the 
invention, these claimants must recover no less than a reasonable 
royalty.  However, commentators disagree as to how this reasonable 
royalty should be determined and what theories of recovery should 
apply.
3
  In their forthcoming paper, Professors John M. Golden & 
Karen E. Sandrik argue that the law of restitution is useful in 
thinking about how a court can determine a reasonable royalty in the 
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1. See, e.g., W. Keith Robinson, Awarding Attorney Fees and Deterring 
“Patent Trolls,” 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 281 passim (2016) (discussing the 
impact of recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the remedy of awarding 
attorney fees to the prevailing party). 
2.  See, e.g., Daniel Harris Brean, Ending Unreasonable Royalties: Why 
Nominal Damages are Adequate to Compensate Patent Assertion Entities for 
Infringement, 39 VT. L. REV. 867, 888 (2015) (arguing that the current 
interpretation of the law permits patent assertion entities to receive windfall 
damage awards improperly).  Whether patent assertion entities are good or bad for 
the patent system is beyond the scope of this essay.  However, there is little doubt 
that this modern trend in patent litigation affects the debate about reasonable 
royalty determinations.  
3. See Caprice L. Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Remedies in 
Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653, 653 (2010) (arguing that restitution 
and unjust enrichment remedies should be available for patent infringement); cf. 
Amanda Frye, “Inextricably Intertwined”: A Restitution Perspective in Patent 
Remedies, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 669, 670 n.3 (2013) (arguing for restitution 
damages for patent infringement). 
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absence of other types of proof.
4
  This essay briefly describes the 
debate about reasonable royalties and explains how Golden & 
Sandrik inject the conversation with new life by using restitution 
theory as a lens for thinking differently about how a court might 
determine reasonable royalties in a way that aligns with the 
underlying purpose of the patent system. 
To understand why patent stakeholders care about reasonable 
royalty determinations, one must consider the current climate of 
patent litigation.  Over the last fifteen years, PAEs have been 
prominent participants in patent litigation.
5
  While there are 
numerous characterizations of PAEs, the most despised of these 
entities, patent trolls, use the threat and cost of patent litigation to 
generate revenue.
6
  Some blame the U.S. civil procedure system for 
the proliferation of patent troll litigation.
7
  In response, the Supreme 
Court recently opined on cases concerning the remedies of injunctive 
relief and attorney fees in ways that impact lawsuits involving all 
PAEs.
8
  However, how a court should determine a reasonable royalty 
in a suit involving a PAE is still an open question. 
Section 284 of the Patent Act indicates that reasonable 
royalties are a floor for recovery.
9
  There are various methods a court 
may use to calculate a reasonable royalty.
10
  The debate over which 
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2001 to describe an entity that, instead of commercializing its patented technology, 
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Approach for Applying Rule 11, 12 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 291, 301 (2014) 
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ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 28 at 30 (Oct. 2014) (discussing the Supreme Court's shift 
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9. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2011). 
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1989) (indicating that selecting the method for computing damages can be chosen 
at the discretion of the court). 
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method is best takes on added complexity when the entity asserting a 
patent is a PAE.  For example, should a reasonable royalty be 
calculated using a compensatory perspective or should restitution 
theory be employed?  Compensatory damages are sufficient to 
indemnify the patent owner for the loss suffered.
11
  In contrast, 
restitution damages are “awarded to a plaintiff when the defendant 
has been unjustly enriched at the plaintiff’s expense.”12 
Unlike compensatory damages, there is disagreement as to 
whether restitution theory has any use in the calculation of a 
reasonable royalty.  For example, Brean asserts that PAEs 
improperly rely on restitutional facts and, as a result, are 
overcompensated for infringement.
13
  Brean argues that damages 
should be compensatory in nature and based on the harm suffered by 
the patent owner.
14
  This idea appeals to those who dislike patent 
trolls, because in most cases patent trolls have suffered no harm and 
therefore will only recover nominal damages.
15
   
Other commentators have rejected the pure compensatory 
approach for restitution theory.
16
  In response to Brean’s concern that 
a restitution theory of recovery will lead to over compensation for 
PAEs, Amanda Frye suggests courts make recovery available only in 
certain circumstances.
17
  For example, Frye limits recovery under a 
restitution theory if litigation is abusive and in cases where the patent 
has been asserted against innocent infringers.
18
  
The forthcoming paper “A Restitution Perspective on 
Reasonable Royalties” may help in solving the debate over how to 
determine a reasonable royalty.  The authors, Golden & Sandrik, 
endorse restitution theory and suggest ways (referred to in their 
paper as “cross-pollination possibilities”) that restitution principles 
can alleviate concerns about how patent damages are calculated for 
PAEs.  The paper begins with a thorough examination of restitution 
and unjust enrichment.  Golden & Sandrik then explain how 
restitution and patent law share some similarities in that they both (1) 
seek to encourage parties to enter into licensing agreements and (2) 
                                                        
11. Compensatory Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
12. Restitution Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
13. Brean, supra note 2, at 868. 
14. Id. at 870. 
15. Id. at 882. 
16. See Roberts, supra note 3, at 672 (supporting “an important unjust 
enrichment remedy: disgorgement”); see also Frye, supra note 3, at 670 (noting 
that the adoption of a pure compensatory approach “is not necessarily sound”). 
17. See Frye, supra note 3, at 691–93 (“A restitution approach should take 
these uses into account and not allow enhanced damages when they are present.”). 
18. Id.  
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seek to deter egregious behavior.  Additionally, “A Restitution 
Perspective on Reasonable Royalties” argues that restitution theory 
can be used to arrive at a reasonable royalty that aligns with the 
underlying purpose of the patent system.  The remainder of this 
essay discusses Golden & Sandrik’s efforts in greater detail and the 
contribution they make to the patent damages debate. 
 “A Restitution Perspective on Reasonable Royalties” argues 
that the law of restitution can provide useful guidance for how we 
should think about the assessment of reasonable royalty damages.
19
   
As noted above, this exercise is important given the current patent 
litigation landscape and that reasonable royalties may be the only 
realistic remedy available to patentees.  According to Golden & 
Sandrik, the advantage that the lens of restitution provides is that it is 
a flexible approach that seems suited to discourage bad-faith 
infringement and reward innovators.
20
 
Given this goal, the paper sets forth some interesting 
historical context.  Historically, damages for patent infringement 
were measured by a pre-established royalty rate, lost profits, nominal 
damages, or disgorgement of the infringer’s profits.21  However, the 
Supreme Court found that in the 1940s Congress eliminated the 
disgorgement remedy when it eliminated the recovery of profits and 
allowed a remedy only for the recovery of damages in patent 
infringement suits.
22
  Despite the elimination of this remedy, courts 
still struggle with several issues that made the disgorgement remedy 
challenging to implement.
23
  These issues include dealing with 
uncertainty, complexity, and expert testimony.
24
   
Determining a reasonable royalty requires the court to 
consider a number of factors.  In Georgia-Pacific v. Plywood 
Corporation, the court set out fifteen factors that could be 
considered, since referred to as the Georgia-Pacific factors.
25
   
Despite these enumerated factors, the consistency and fairness of 
outcomes can be impacted by a court’s ability to use a number of 
                                                        
19. Golden & Sandrik, supra note 4, at 1. 
20. Id. at 2. 
21. 7 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.02[2] (2016). 
22. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 
(1964). 
23. See generally Golden & Sandrik, supra note 4. 
24. Id.at 11. 
25. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-
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methods, at its discretion.
26
  In addition to these methods, a court can 
also vary its damage calculations based on the infringing activity.
27
   
Golden & Sandrik suggest two specific areas where 
restitution might be helpful in thinking about reasonable royalty 
calculations: alternative measures for monetary relief and fault and 
responsibility.
28
  Under measures for monetary relief, the paper 
asserts that the cost of the process of invention and the social value 
of the invention could be used to arrive at a reasonable royalty.
29
   
Golden & Sandrik argue that in addition to the existing 
Georgia-Pacific factors, cost measures should also be considered.
30
  
A cost-based measure would reward a patentee for the relevant cost 
of the invention.
31
  One implication of using cost-based measures 
might be that it restricts remedies available to certain patentees.  For 
example, would this framework prevent PAEs from obtaining large 
damage awards?  The cost-based measures framework also seems 
likely to favor companies with large R&D budgets, which may be 
why Golden & Sandrik highlight the social and technical value of the 
asserted patent as an important factor.
32
   
Specifically, the authors claim that these considerations are in 
harmony with the underlying purpose of the patent system and 
mirror the way in which restitution uses liability concerns to resolve 
difficult cases.
33
  But an open question remains as to how a court 
would determine social value or technical significance of a patent 
during its term.   
A final advantage of embracing restitution theory is that 
courts can consider the blameworthiness of a defendant in fashioning 
a measure of recovery.
34
  Golden & Sandrik identify two liability 
concerns of interest: fault and responsibility.
35
  They argue that these 
concerns can be used beyond determinations for attorney fees in 
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27. See Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 616 
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36. Id. at 36. 
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The paper also suggests five categories of blameworthiness: 
(1) independent inventor, (2) infringer without notice, (3) infringer 
with no mitigating characteristics, (4) infringers without notice of 
some risk, and (5) conscious infringers.
37
  There is evidence that 
courts have applied a version of this fault or responsibility 
framework.  For example, in Stickle, the Federal Circuit supported 
the idea that in setting the reasonable royalty, a court could consider 
the fact that the party using the invention is an infringer, not a 
willing licensee.
38
  Further, Sun Studs seems to suggest that courts 




In sum, “A Restitution Perspective on Reasonable Royalties” 
is an insightful work that acknowledges that patent law does not 
exist in a vacuum.  Golden & Sandrik contribute to the patent 
damages debate by explaining how a considered examination of 
restitution theory can help alleviate some of the concerns regarding 
patent damages and patent assertion entities.  Moreover, the paper 
attempts to demonstrate how restitution theory aligns with 
encouraging invention and innovation. 
                                                        
37. Id. at 37. 
38. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
39. See Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 994 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides 
Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“We have recognized that 
compensation for infringement can take cognizance of the actual commercial 
consequences of the infringement, and that the hypothetical negotiators need not 
act as if there had been no infringement, no litigation, and no erosion of market 
position or patent value.”).  
